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Digital Insiders and Informed Trading Before Earnings Announcements 
 Abstract 
While it is widely acknowledged that companies face increasing cybersecurity risk stemming from 
hackers stealing customer information, a relatively unknown cybersecurity risk is from information 
leakage and subsequent trading by digital insiders – hackers who target corporations to obtain non-
public corporate information for illegal trading. We use a firm-specific measure of cybersecurity risk 
mitigation based on textual analysis of 10-Ks to proxy for the organization’s ability to reduce the 
probability of digital insider trading. We find that a larger share of new earnings information is 
incorporated into prices prior to earnings announcements for firms with low cybersecurity risk 
mitigation scores. We also find that pre-announcement trading by short sellers is more predictive of 
earnings surprises for firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation. Further, on days closer to earnings 
announcements, firms with relatively low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores experience a larger 
increase in bid-ask spreads, particularly the adverse selection component. These results suggest that 
weak cybersecurity risk mitigation provides opportunities for acquisition of private information and 
that trading by privately informed traders is more likely in stocks of firms with higher exposure to 
cybercrimes. 
JEL classification: G14, G18, K24, M48, M41 
Keywords: liquidity, cybersecurity, cybersecurity risk disclosure, adverse selection, bid ask spread, 
probability of informed trading, private information, hacking, cybersecurity risk mitigation, price jump 
ratio, textual analysis, short selling. 
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Digital Insiders and Informed Trading Before Earnings Announcements 
1. Introduction
There is an increasing number of cases where “hackers” of corporate information systems obtain 
proprietary firm data and use this information to conduct illegal stock market trades.1 Fin4, which is a group 
of hackers that has been operating since at least 2013, is a prominent example. Fin4 hackers illegally 
obtained data for trading purposes from more than 100 companies, systematically targeting employees such 
as C-level executives, legal counsel, and risk and compliance personnel, who might possess value-relevant 
non-public information.2 Rather than installing malware or ransomware to get a payout, these ‘digital 
insiders’ (Carson 2017) steal identities (e.g., through phishing emails) to obtain access to privileged 
accounts. Once the cybercriminals insinuate themselves into the firm’s system, they install hidden 
surveillance tools to gather valuable undisclosed information, which can subsequently be exploited in the 
stock market.3 While these activities are potentially very damaging to the integrity of financial markets, it 
is difficult to establish their impact due to their secretive nature. In this paper, we examine whether firm 
cybersecurity risk mitigation affects differences in the extent to which private information is traded on and 
is reflected in prices prior to earnings announcements. 
1 https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-09-20 . 
2https://www.computerworld.com/article/2853697/fireeye-suspects-fin4-hackers-are-americans-after-insider-info-to-
game-stock-market.html and http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/38118/cyber-crime/sec-investigates-fin4-
hackers.html. In a similar incident in 2016, a former Expedia IT specialist remotely hacked into computers and email 
accounts of senior Expedia executives and made highly profitable trades in Expedia securities ahead of company 
announcements (https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-280.html ) Cyber criminals have also successfully 
targeted media firms (https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-163.html), law firms, 
(https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/05/11/hackers-stole-information-law-firms-made-millions-insider-trading-
fined-9-million/ ) and advisory firms (https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/25/deloitte-hit-by-cyber-
attack-revealing-clients-secret-emails) to steal non-public information about mergers and acquisitions or earnings 
announcements. We note that trades based upon hacked information can be made by the hackers themselves or by 
others who receive the information derived from hacking.   
3 Cybercriminals often try to hack the credentials of key employees to get access to valuable information that is shared 
via emails, or in files with limited security (https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertadams/2017/04/04/top-online-threats-
to-your-cybersecurity-and-how-to-deal-with-them/#5e28979e31be ). This threat becomes amplified as technology 
and communication networks and systems become more interconnected (Hamm 2019). 
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We develop a cybersecurity risk mitigation measure based on textual analysis of 10-K disclosures 
starting in 2011. This timeframe is driven by SEC guidance in 2011, which requires companies to include 
material information related to cybersecurity risk in their periodic filings (CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic 
No. 2 Cybersecurity). We argue that 10-K disclosures contain information about how firms address and 
mitigate cybersecurity risks and are unlikely to provide information that exposes them to additional cyber-
related risk from hackers.4 Our measure counts the number of words and phrases that relate to risk 
mitigation within cybersecurity-related excerpts from the 10-K reports.5 These excerpts comprise 
paragraphs in the 10-K that we identify by searching for use of cybersecurity-related words. The word 
search is based on a dictionary of cybersecurity terminology that we developed from the glossary of the 
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS) and a report on laws relating to 
cybersecurity prepared by the Congressional Research Service (Fischer 2014). Our cybersecurity risk 
mitigation dictionary aims to capture strategies relating to hardware and software solutions that address 
cybersecurity risks, as well as management systems to improve employee awareness and to hold third 
parties such as auditors and legal advisers to higher cybersecurity standards.  
We test the prediction that firms with higher cybersecurity risk mitigation scores are less likely to 
experience leakage of inside information due to the activities of cyber criminals. Our empirical tests 
examine the impact of cybersecurity risk mitigation on the probability that private information will be 
traded on and reflected in prices before earnings announcements.6 We focus on earnings announcements 
because of the documented trading activity of hackers preceding earnings announcements (see footnote 2). 
Our first test employs the price jump ratio (Weller 2017) to investigate the relative pre-announcement 
                                                          
4 SEC (2011) states that, “federal securities laws do not require disclosure that itself would compromise a registrant’s 
cybersecurity.” This interpretation is consistent with result in Berkman et al. (2018a), who find positive market 
valuations for a broader cybersecurity measure based upon 10-K disclosures. 
5 It might be possible to obtain firm-specific measures of cybersecurity from trawling dark web marketplaces. 
However, the most valuable inside information cannot be advertised openly online, since doing so would cause the 
information to lose its value. There are specialized dark web sites such as ‘The Stock Insider’ that solve this problem 
by employing strict access restrictions, thus providing sellers and buyers of inside information with a sense of 
protection. See also: https://www.securityweek.com/financial-industry-insiders-put-keys-kingdom-risk.  
6 Akey et al. (2019) find that private information traded upon by digital insiders is impounded in price prior to public 
release of the information. 
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information content of prices. The price jump ratio divides the return at the time of the earnings 
information’s public disclosure by the total return over a longer pre-announcement period. Consistent with 
our expectation, we find that firms with high cybersecurity risk mitigation scores have a high price jump 
ratio, indicating that a relatively large proportion of earnings information is not discovered until the earnings 
announcement.  
Our second test examines the impact of a firm’s cybersecurity risk mitigation on the relative amount 
of short selling before earnings announcements due to informed trading. This test is motivated by several 
charges brought by the SEC, where hackers short-sold stocks just before firm disclosure of disappointing 
earnings news.7 Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that pre-announcement trading by short sellers for 
firms with lower cybersecurity risk mitigation scores is more negatively related to earnings surprises. This 
implies that the ability of informed traders (proxied by the relative trading activity of short sellers) to predict 
earnings surprises is greater for firms with lower levels of cybersecurity risk mitigation.  
The first two tests suggest that there is a greater incidence of informed trading in the pre-
announcement period for firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores. In our third test, we exploit 
the increased information asymmetry during the period just before earnings announcements (Bhattacharya 
et al. 2013; Chae 2005; Lee et al. 1993). We provide evidence that relative to other pre-announcement days, 
in the days leading up to earnings announcements, firms with lower cybersecurity risk mitigation scores 
experience a larger increase in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. These results are 
consistent with the idea that liquidity providers will require more ex-ante compensation for firms with low 
cybersecurity risk mitigation scores in periods of increased exposure to informed trading (e.g., Glosten and 
Harris 1988).  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. Many studies examine the impact of specific 
groups of potentially informed market participants on price formation (some examples are insiders 
(Schnitzlein 2002; Seyhun 1986), short sellers (Chen and Singal 2003; Saffi and Sigurdsson 2010), analysts 
                                                          




(Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995; Gleason and Lee 2003), and institutional investors (Piotroski and 
Roulstone 2004; Lakonishok et al. 1992)). We add hackers and their associates to this list of potentially 
informed market participants. We provide evidence suggesting that firms trying to manage their exposure 
to cybercrime can reduce the probability that private information will be traded on before disclosure. We 
also find that the association between a firm’s cybersecurity risk mitigation score and the cost of liquidity 
– in particular the adverse selection component – is significantly more negative on days with a high 
probability of trading with informed traders. Given increasing recognition of risks associated with hackers 
infiltrating firms and obtaining private information for illegal trading (SEC 2018), our findings are timely 
and should be of interest to regulators, management, and investors. 
We also contribute to the literature on cybersecurity risk disclosures by providing evidence that 
cybersecurity disclosures in 10-K filings provide useful insight into firm exposure to cybersecurity risks 
and help explain variation in the probability of private information leakage. As such, we contribute to the 
literature that examines implications of increased requirements for risk disclosures (Miihkinen 2012; Kravet 
and Muslu 2013; Campbell et al. 2014; Berkman et al. 2018b; Hope et al. 2016). Our findings should be 
informative to regulators (who are facing calls for improved cybersecurity disclosure requirements from 
within the SEC),8 auditors (who are charged with understanding potential weaknesses in the systems that 
support the financial reporting process (Hamm 2019), academics (Gordon et al. 2015; Ferraro 2014; 
Selznick and LaMacchia 2016), and other market participants.9 
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on the relation between earnings and returns by 
showing a new channel through which earnings information gets impounded into prices in the period before 
it is released (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Bushee et al. 2010; Huang and Skantz 2016). Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) find that at the time of earnings announcement, most information is already impounded 
                                                          
8 See the statements from Commissioner Kara M. Stein (https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-stein-
2018-02-21) and Commissioner Robert J. Jackson Jr (https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-





into prices. We contribute to this literature on information asymmetry in the pre-earnings announcement 
period and price formation by showing that price discovery in the pre-announcement period differs among 
firms based upon their cybersecurity risk management. Our results thus suggest that a firm’s management 
of its cybersecurity risk is important to its information environment. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
In this section we review prior research on cybersecurity. We then develop our hypotheses on the 
relation between cybersecurity risk mitigation, the probability of leakage of private information and the 
cost of liquidity. 
2.1 Prior literature on cybersecurity 
Research on cybersecurity in accounting and finance can be split into two streams. The first stream 
provides evidence on the impact of cybersecurity disclosures on market valuations. In the period before the 
SEC guidance on disclosure of cybersecurity risk (SEC 2011), Gordon et al. (2010) find higher market 
valuations for the small proportion of firms that voluntarily disclosed cybersecurity risks. Following the 
SEC guidance and using a broad sample of firms, Berkman et al. (2018a) find that more informative cyber 
disclosures are associated with higher market valuations. 
The second stream of research examines the consequences of cybersecurity events. Several articles 
find evidence that positive cybersecurity events such as IT security investments (Im et al. 2001; Chai et al. 
2011; Bose and Leung 2013) and/or creation of a Chief Information Officer position (Chatterjee et al. 2001) 
are associated with higher stock prices. Relatedly, Kwon et al. (2012) find that greater total IT executive 
compensation is associated with a lower likelihood of information security breaches. Firms also suffer fewer 
security breaches when they have stronger internal controls (Westland 2018) and when there is a higher 
quality relationship between the internal audit and the information security function (Steinbart et al. 2018). 
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Studies that examine the consequences of negative cybersecurity events generally find evidence of 
negative market reactions to the events.10 For example, research indicates that announcements of software 
vulnerability (Telang and Wattal 2007), IT products containing viruses (Hovav and D'arcy 2005), and 
cybersecurity breaches are associated with negative market reactions (Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Yayla and Hu 
2011; Gordon et al. 2011; Amir et al. 2018; Modi et al. 2015; Kamiya et al. 2018). Such events also 
negatively affect the performance and liquidity of a firm. Bianchi and Tosun (2019) find that firms 
experience a decrease in liquidity and that daily excess returns are lower following the revelation of a first-
time corporate hacking event. Mitts and Talley (2018) find evidence consistent with arbitrageurs obtaining 
early notice of impending breach announcements and profiting from short-selling. Akey et al. (2019) 
provide direct evidence that prior to its public release, private information traded upon by digital insiders 
is impounded in price. 
While the above studies highlight the need for firms to actively mitigate cybersecurity risks, there 
is comparatively little research on cybersecurity risk mitigation. One exception is a study by Wang et al. 
(2013) who find that firms disclosing security risk factors with risk-mitigation themes are less likely to have 
future breach announcements. We extend this literature by providing evidence that firm cybersecurity risk 
mitigation strategies reduce the probability of informed trading by digital insiders prior to earnings 
announcements. 
2.2 Hypotheses development  
2.2.1 Price discovery and information acquisition 
A key aspect of our study is investigating whether cybersecurity risk mitigation impacts how 
earnings-related information is impounded into price. Early research on price formation employs a measure 
of intra-period timeliness (IPT) to investigate the speed with which information is impounded into prices 
during an earnings quarter (Ball and Brown 1968; McNichols 1984; Butler et al. 2007; Alford et al. 1993). 
                                                          
10 Spanos and Angelis (2016) provide a comprehensive review of the stock market impacts of security events. 
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Fast price discovery implies that the end-of-quarter perfect foresight price level is attained early in the 
quarter.  
Weller (2017) extends the literature by introducing the price jump ratio (PJR). The price jump ratio 
measures the share of information incorporated into the price before the earnings announcement of a 
specific stock. The PJR is defined as the cumulative abnormal return in a short window around the earnings 
announcement relative to the cumulative abnormal return for the same stock over a longer pre-
announcement window ending on the same day as the short earnings announcement window. A high PJR, 
indicating a large announcement price change relative to the pre-announcement price change, is consistent 
with little pre-announcement informed trading. In contrast, a low PJR, indicating a small announcement 
price change relative to the pre-announcement price change, suggests aggressive informed trading in the 
pre-announcement period. 
Based on the conjecture that firms providing more extensive cybersecurity risk-mitigating 
disclosure are more likely to have taken measures to manage that risk, we hypothesize that informed trading 
by hackers is more likely in firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores. For these firms, we expect 
relatively less discovery of new earnings information upon announcement, resulting in a lower price jump 
ratio. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Earnings announcement price jump ratios are positively associated with cybersecurity 
risk mitigation. 
2.2.2 Probability of information leakage 
Digital insiders gain access to information that may relate to positive or negative earnings surprise. 
Informed traders can benefit from this information through either long or short selling in advance of the 
earnings announcement. We focus on short selling because there is no daily data on trading by a group of 
equally well-informed long-side investors. In a wide variety of settings, research provides evidence 
consistent with short sellers anticipating future information releases by exploiting private information. For 
example, there is greater short selling activity in the days leading up to downgrades by analysts (Christophe 
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et al. 2010) and insider sales (Chakrabarty and Shkilko 2013; Khan and Lu 2013). Karpoff and Lou (2010) 
find that abnormal short selling increases in the period before disclosure of misrepresentations. In a 
cybersecurity-related setting, Mitts and Talley (2018) find evidence that prior to firm breach 
announcements, informed traders take short positions against the hacked firms. Studies also show that short 
interest increases prior to the announcement of private placements in which hedge funds are involved 
(Berkman et al. 2016) and that short sellers are able to profitably exploit material non-public information 
arising from the syndicated lending process (Massoud et al. 2011).  
Weak cybersecurity risk mitigation by firms should increase the probability that hackers can obtain 
(and exploit or sell) private information related to earnings. As a result, with a higher probability of 
information leakage, pre-announcement trading by short sellers should be more negatively associated with 
earnings surprises for firms with lower cybersecurity risk mitigation scores. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Short selling in the days before earnings announcements is more predictive of earnings 
surprises for firms with low scores on cybersecurity risk mitigation. 
2.2.3 The cost of liquidity and informed trading  
Theoretical models of the cost of liquidity typically assume that one set of traders provides liquidity 
via quotes or limit orders and another set of traders initiates trades for liquidity or for informational reasons 
(Holden et al. 2014; Huang and Stoll 1996). These models typically posit that the spread provides suppliers 
of liquidity with compensation for: 1) adverse selection costs (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985; 
Easley and O'Hara 1987); 2) order processing costs (Roll 1984); and 3) inventory holding costs (Amihud 
and Mendelson 1980; Ho and Stoll 1981; Ho and Stoll 1983). Building on these models, several papers 
attempt to measure components of the bid-ask spread, in particular the component related to adverse 
selection risk (e.g., Glosten and Harris 1988; Stoll 1989; Hasbrouck 1991; Lin et al. 1995).  
 Using measures derived from trade and quote data, several empirical studies examine the 
association between firm or ownership characteristics that might proxy for information asymmetry and the 
cost of liquidity and adverse selection. For example, Loughran and Schultz (2005) find that rural stocks, 
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which are more likely to be held by better-informed local investors, have lower turnover and higher quoted 
and effective spreads than urban stocks (see also Ivković and Weisbenner 2005). Berkman et al. (2014) find 
that underaged account holders (whose trades are likely to be controlled by informed guardians) outperform 
older investors and that stocks have higher bid-ask spreads if there is a higher proportion of underaged 
trading. In the accounting literature, using earnings quality as a measure of information asymmetry, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2013) find that poor earnings quality is associated with adverse selection risk as 
measured by the price impact of trade, and that poor earnings quality is associated with increased 
information asymmetry around earnings announcements.11  
Our study builds on prior research findings that information asymmetry increases and liquidity 
deteriorates around earnings announcements (Lee et al. 1993; Bhattacharya et al. 2013). Firms with low 
cybersecurity mitigation are more susceptible to being hacked, with a concomitant higher likelihood of 
digital insiders trading on information about forthcoming earnings news. If suppliers of liquidity anticipate 
this increased probability of facing informed traders prior to earnings announcements, then the bid-ask 
spread, particularly the adverse selection component, should widen. We conjecture that in the days shortly 
before earnings releases, the cost of liquidity increases relatively more for firms with low cybersecurity risk 
mitigation.  
HYPOTHESIS 3. In the days leading up to earnings announcements, the cost of liquidity becomes 
negatively associated with firm cybersecurity risk mitigation. 
3. Sample, variables and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Sample  
Our sample period starts with fiscal year 2012, the first fiscal year subsequent to the SEC guidance 
on cybersecurity risk disclosure. For fiscal years 2012–2016, we construct a cybersecurity risk mitigation 
                                                          
11 In contrast to studies that suggest microstructure measures of adverse selection are positively related to information 
asymmetry, Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) find that when informed traders have a relatively long period to select 
when and how to trade, standard measures of adverse selection may fail to capture the presence of informed trading.  
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measure using cybersecurity-related excerpts from 10-Ks of Russell 3000 firms. After merging the 
cybersecurity risk mitigation data with Compustat and CRSP, our sample is reduced to 13,187 firm-year 
observations, with cybersecurity risk mitigation scores for 3,096 firms. To identify ‘event day 0’, the first 
day after the quarterly earnings announcement that the closing price reflects the new earnings information, 
we use earnings announcement date and time from the I/B/E/S database. We adjust event day 0 for after-
hours earnings announcements. In addition, after merging I/B/E/S and Compustat databases using the 
linking table in WRDS and requiring the best match score, we require that the earnings announcement date 
be the same in both databases. As a result of these requirements, our sample drops to 9,720 firm-years for 
2,316 firms. Our final sample requirement is the availability of trade and quote data in DTAQ. To merge 
with the DTAQ database we use the linking table provided in WRDS, resulting in a final sample of 30,187 
quarterly earnings announcements for 2,059 firms. 
3.2 Variables of interest 
3.2.1 Cybersecurity risk mitigation measure 
Our cybersecurity risk mitigation measure is constructed using cybersecurity-related excerpts from 
10-Ks for Russell 3000 firms for fiscal years 2012–2016.12 Cybersecurity-related excerpts comprise 
paragraphs from 10-K disclosures containing words or phrases that directly relate to cybersecurity themes. 
Our dictionary of cybersecurity terminology is based upon the glossary from the National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS) and the Congressional Research Service report on laws relating 
to cybersecurity (Fischer 2014). Our cybersecurity risk mitigation measure, MitigationWords, is the number 
of words or phrases in the cybersecurity-related excerpts that we identify as describing risk mitigation 
themes. Appendix A.1 provides the terms included in the dictionary for this measure. Although many of 
these words (e.g., insurance and training) are not uniquely related to cybersecurity and thus could be 
generalized to other themes, we examine usage of these words solely within the context of cybersecurity 
                                                          
12 See Appendix A for a more in-depth description of our score development. The score was produced in 
conjunction with CookESG (cookesg.com/g.com/). 
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(i.e., in the cybersecurity-related excerpts). This provides confidence that the disclosed mitigation measures 
relate specifically to cybersecurity and not to a more general risk management strategy by the firm. 
Appendix A.2 provides examples of 10-K excerpts containing cybersecurity risk mitigation themes. 
Additional tests in Section 5 indicate that our results are robust to inclusion of controls for firms’ overall 
risk mitigation strategy.  
 
3.2.2 Price Jump Ratio 
For our test of Hypothesis 1, the measure of PJR for the earnings announcement of stock i in quarter t is 
defined as: 
 ( )0,2 / 21,2( )it it itPJR CAR CAR= −         (1) 
Similar to Weller (2017), we estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) relative to a Fama and 
French (1992) three-factor model, using daily returns over a 365-calendar day window ending 90 days 
before the earnings announcement (we require at least 63 valid preceding trading days). The pre-
announcement period starts on trading day -21 (about 1 month) and to ensure that prices fully reflect the 
new information, the total window ends 2 trading days after the earnings announcement. Our announcement 
return window starts on day 0 and ends 2 days after the earnings announcement.13 
To address the problem of a near-zero denominator in the PJR, we exclude events in the lowest 
decile of absolute value CAR(-21,+2). By excluding observations with small denominators (i.e., CAR(-
21,+2) is close to 0), we exclude observations with low signal-to-noise ratios that are also non-events from 
the perspective of informed traders (see Weller 2017). In robustness tests, we also present results that use 
different exclusion cut-offs for CAR(-21,+2). 
                                                          
13 In sensitivity tests, we present results for different windows. Note that our earnings announcement window starts 
on day 0 rather than day -1 as in Weller (2017). We adjust earnings announcement dates for after-hours 




3.2.3 Abnormal short-selling measure 
For our test of Hypothesis 2, following prior literature (Christophe et al. 2004; Engelberg et al. 
2012) we measure the level of daily short selling for firm i on day t as the daily number of shares sold short 










SHVOL = ×   (2) 
To measure abnormal short selling for a specific stock on a given day, we calculate the deviation 
of the level of short selling on that day from a “normal” benchmark level for that stock. We define normal 
short selling separately for every event (i.e., earnings announcement) as the mean short sales over event 
days -40 to -11 for that stock. Abnormal short volume, ASHVOL, is calculated as:  
 , , ( 40, 11)i t i t iASHVOL SHVOL SHVOL= − − −  (3) 
3.2.4 Liquidity measures 
Our tests of Hypothesis 3 for the relation between the cost of liquidity and cybersecurity risk 
mitigation focus on the dollar-weighted average percentage effective spread (ESPREAD), Kyle’s (1985) 
lambda (LAMBDA), and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (AMI). Our data source for ESPREAD and 
LAMBDA is the daily TAQ database (DTAQ). We use SAS code available on Craig Holden’s website 
(https://kelley.iu.edu/cholden/) and follow the trade-signing approach of Lee and Ready (1991), using 
contemporaneous quotes to sign trades (e.g., Bessembinder 2003). Calculation of AMI employs daily CRSP 
data. 
The effective spread is the difference between an estimate of the true value of the security (the 
midpoint of the bid and ask) and the actual transaction price, and is computed by comparing the trade price 
to the prevailing quote midpoint (Huang and Stoll 1996; Bessembinder and Kaufman 1997). For each stock 
in each day, we calculate the dollar-weighted average percentage effective spread, based on the following 
definition of the effective spread for a trade at time t: 
13 
 
( ) ( )( )   2  t t t tPercent Effective Spread D Ln P Ln M= × −     (4) 
where Dt is an indicator variable that equals +1 if the trade at time t is buyer-initiated and −1 if the 
trade at time t is seller-initiated. Mt is the midpoint of the consolidated best bid and offer at the moment of 
the trade. 
Kyle’s (1985) lambda, LAMBDA, is a measure of adverse selection through price impact. It 
represents the extent to which signed order flow affects a security’s price. We follow Hasbrouck (2009) 
and define LAMBDA as the slope of the following regression: 
n n nr Sλ ε= +            (5) 
where nr  is the security’s log price change in the nth five-minute period, nS  is the signed square-
root of dollar volume in the nth five-minute period, and nε  is the error term. nS  is defined by  
( )( | |n kn knS sign v SQRT v= ∑ ×         (6) 
where nkν  is the signed dollar volume of the kth trade in the nth five-minute period. 
Our second measure of adverse selection through price impact is the measure proposed by Amihud 
(2002). The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, AMI, is the ratio of absolute value of daily stock return to 
the daily dollar trading volume.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics of our measures. The number of cybersecurity risk 
mitigation words (MitigationWords), ranges from 0 to 305 and the average (median) number of 
cybersecurity risk mitigation words in the cybersecurity-related excerpts is 6.5 (3). Based upon the 
distribution of MitigationWords, in our subsequent empirical tests, we use the natural log of number of 
cybersecurity risk mitigation words plus one, LMitigationWords. 
We winsorize PJR and the liquidity measures at the 1st and 99th percent levels to reduce the effect 
of outliers. PJR has a mean value of 0.51, indicating that a substantial amount of total price discovery in 
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the period from 1 month before the earnings announcement to 2 days after the earnings announcement takes 
place in the last 3 days. The number of observations for PJR is lower than for the other variables in table 1 
because we exclude the decile of observations with the lowest absolute value of CAR(-21,+2). The average 
effective spread (ESPREAD) in our sample is 0.21% of the bid-ask spread mid-price. After multiplying by 
a factor 100,000, the average lambda (LAMBDA) equals 0.249, and after multiplying by a factor 1,000,000, 
the average Amihud measure (AMI) is 10.1. Apart from PJR, all market-based variables in Table 1 are 
measured over trading days -42 to -22 before each earnings announcement. 
In Table 1, Panel B we report the Pearson correlations between PJR, the liquidity measures, the 
cybersecurity risk mitigation measure and control variables. Correlations between PJR and our 
cybersecurity risk mitigation measure, price, institutional ownership, and the liquidity measures are 
statistically significant, but low in magnitude (all correlations < |0.05|). As expected, liquidity measures are 
lower for larger firms and for higher-priced firms. Firms with higher volatility have higher values for our 
liquidity measures. Firms with more mitigation words also tend to have longer cybersecurity-related 
discussions in their 10-Ks (the correlation between LMitigationWords and LCyberWords is 0.68). 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
4 Empirical method and results 
4.1 Information leakage and pre-announcement price discovery. 
In this section we test our first hypothesis, that privately informed trading by hackers is more likely 
in firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation, resulting in relatively fast discovery of new earnings 
information for these firms. Based on Weller (2017) and using PJR as the dependent variable, we estimate 
the following model: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,





i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
PJR a LMitigationWords LCyberWords LNMV LN PRC
BIDASK LN STDRET ANALYST IO YEARFE
β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + + +
+ + + + +
  (7) 
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The model contains the same control variables as Weller (2017), including the natural log of market 
capitalization (LNMV), the natural log of the standard deviation of daily returns (LN(STDRET), average 
share price (LN(PRC)) and bid ask spread (BIDASK), all of which are computed over the period from event 
day -42 through event day -22. We also control for the number of analysts covering stock i in quarter t-1 
(ANALYST), from I/B/E/S, and the institutional ownership ratio at the end of the preceding quarter from 
13-F filings (IO). Standard errors are two-way clustered by stock and quarter. 
Table 2 presents the results from estimating equation (7). Column (1) presents results for the base 
model. In column (2), we include the number of words or phrases in all cybersecurity-related excerpts in a 
firm’s disclosures in the entire 10-K filing for a given year (LCyberWords) as an addition control to ensure 
that our results are not driven merely by the amount of cybersecurity disclosures provided by a firm. Column 
(3) reports results when we exclude the first percentile of observations with the smallest absolute CAR(-
21,+2) instead of the decile of observations with the smallest absolute CAR(-21,+2). Column (4) provides 
results when we drop the quartile of observations with the smallest absolute CAR(-21,+2). Columns (5) and 
(6) repeat the analysis in the third column, but use CAR(-10,+2) and CAR(-3,+2) in the denominator of PJR. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Similar to Weller (2017), we find that the price jump at the earnings announcement is higher (or 
equivalently, that information leakage before the earnings announcement is lower) for firms covered by a 
larger number of analysts and higher institutional ownership. Further, the price jump at the earnings 
announcement decreases with firm size, quoted spread and volatility. For our test of Hypothesis 1, in 
column (1), the coefficient of LMitigationWords is positive and significant at the one percent level. This 
result indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in LMitigationWords increases the PJR by 0.0293. 
The average PJR for this sample is 0.51, implying that a one standard deviation increase in 
LMitigationWords corresponds to a 6 percent increase in the fraction of the price discovery that occurs at 
the time of the public announcement. Results in column (2) indicate that LMitigationWords continues to 
have explanatory power even when LCyberWords is included in the model. These results provide evidence 
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that 1) company cybersecurity risk mitigation disclosures are not boilerplate; and 2) the extensiveness of 
disclosures about cybersecurity risk mitigation is not simply indicative of more extensive cybersecurity risk 
disclosures. 
Results reported in the third column are based on a sample where only the first percentile of 
observations with the smallest absolute CAR(-21,+2) are trimmed from the sample. Consistent with our 
expectations, the coefficient of our cybersecurity risk mitigation measure becomes insignificant. This result 
supports our initial exclusion of observations with small denominators (i.e., where CAR(-21,+2) is close to 
0), due to the low signal-to-noise ratios for these observations. When we trim the quartile of observations 
with the smallest absolute CAR(-21,+2) from the sample, the magnitude and significance of the 
LMitigationWords coefficient increases (column (4)). Results in the last two columns indicate that 
LMitigationWords is positively associated with the PJR if the PJR is based on a pre-announcement window 
that is limited to the last 10 days before the earnings announcement (column (5)), or the last 3 days before 
the earnings announcement (column (6)). Overall our results consistently indicate that more price discovery 
takes place in the pre-announcement period for firms with lower cybersecurity risk mitigation.  
4.2 Cybersecurity risk mitigation and short selling 
In this section we test our second hypothesis, that relatively low cybersecurity risk mitigation is 
associated with more informative short selling in the days before earnings announcements. We obtain data 
on short sales transactions from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) website.14 Beginning 
in August 2009, FINRA provides data of short sale transactions that include transaction times, prices, and 
sizes for all short sales of National Market System stocks.  
                                                          
14 The FINRA short transactions data have been used in prior studies (e.g., Jain et al. 2013; Jain et al. 2012; Berkman 
and Eugster 2017). For more information on the short sales transactions on FINRA, see 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p120044.pdf .  
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To test if short sellers have an ability to predict earnings surprises, we estimate a model where the 
dependent variable is RSURPRISE, and specify the following model: 
          (8)     
 
where RSURPRISE is defined as the quarterly rank decile of the earnings surprise with earnings surprise 
defined as the difference between the actual earnings per share and the most recent average earnings per 
share forecast from I/B/E/S, scaled by the absolute value of this most recent average earnings per share 
forecast.  
Control variables are based on prior studies in the short sales literature (e.g., Christophe et al. 2004; 
Christophe et al. 2010; Blau and Wade 2012; Henry et al. 2015). LNMV is the natural logarithm of the 
stock’s market capitalization averaged over event day -40 to -11. The firm’s book-to-market equity ratio, 
BM, is calculated as at the latest quarter-end prior to the announcement. LN(PRC) is the natural logarithm 
of the stock’s closing price and BIDASK is the percentage difference between the closing bid and ask price. 
TURN is the number of shares traded during the day as a proportion of shares outstanding. These last three 
variables are calculated as the average over event day -40 through -11. We include two measures of 
cumulative abnormal returns: over event days -40 to -6, CAR(-40,-6), and over the last week, CAR(-5,-1). 
Finally, we also control for return volatility, STDRET, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns over event days -40 through -11. ( 5, 1)ASHVOL − −  is the average daily abnormal short volume 
over the week before the earnings announcement.15 Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter 
levels. 
                                                          
15 We follow Berkman and Eugster (2017) and use abnormal short selling measured over the last five trading days 
before the earnings announcement in our base case model.  
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The key independent variable in the regression is the interaction term for LMitigationWords and 
( 5, 1)ASHVOL − − . Our main hypothesis is that pre-announcement informed short sales are more likely in 
firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation. If informed short selling prior to the announcement of earnings 
surprises is higher for firms with weak cybersecurity risk mitigation, we expect a significant positive 
coefficient of the interaction term between our cybersecurity risk mitigation measures and pre-
announcement short selling. That is, the relation between earnings surprise and pre-announcement short 
selling is more negative for firms with relatively low scores on LMitigationWords. 
Results of this analysis in Table 3 indicate that negative earnings surprises are more prevalent at 
firms with high volatility, low stock price and low book-to-market ratios. We also find that the abnormal 
stock return before the earnings announcement is positively associated with the forthcoming earnings news 
for both pre-announcement windows (-40,-6) and (-5,-1). In line with our prediction, the interaction term 
between LMitigationWords and ASHVOL has a positive coefficient, which is significant at the one percent 
level. Consistent with our analysis of PJR in the previous section, the results in the second column show 
that our inferences remain robust after including LCyberWords as well as the interaction term between 
LCyberWords and ASHVOL. 
Columns (3) - (6) in Table 3 present the results of several alternative specifications, each model 
making one change relative to the specification in column (2). The model in column (3) employs the actual 
earnings surprise (winsorized at 1% and 99%) rather than the decile rank as dependent variable. Results in 
column (4) are based on abnormal short selling on the day before the earnings announcement rather than 
the week before the earnings announcement. Column (5) presents results when the earnings surprise 
measure is calculated as the difference between the actual earnings per share and the most recent average 
earnings per share estimate across analysts, scaled by the standard deviation across analyst estimates.  
Finally, column (6) presents results using the median earnings per share forecast across analysts 
instead of the mean earnings per share forecast to calculate the earnings surprise measure. Results of 
robustness tests in columns (3) - (6) are all consistent with the specification in column (2) and consistently 
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show a positive and significant association between earnings surprise and the interaction variable between 
our cybersecurity risk mitigation variable and abnormal short selling.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
4.3 Cybersecurity and the cost of liquidity around earnings announcements 
In this section, we test the third hypothesis, which predicts that during days closer to earnings 
announcements, liquidity suppliers require relatively higher compensation for stocks where there is a higher 
probability of trading by digital insiders. To test this hypothesis, we select the 35 trading days before each 
earnings announcement for our sample stocks. For each earnings announcement, we calculate abnormal 
values for each liquidity measure for day -10 through day -1, using the mean and standard deviation based 
on the 25 trading days from day -35 to day -11. We use three commonly used measures of liquidity: (1) 
effective spread (ESPREAD), (2) Kyle’s (1985) lambda (LAMBDA), and (3) Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure (AMI). The abnormal value of each liquidity measure (1-3) on day t relative to the earnings 
announcement day for quarter q for stock i is defined as follows: 
( )1 3, , , 1 3, , , 1 3, , 1 3, , _  _  / _i q t i q t i q i qA LM LM M LM S LM− − − −= −                           (9) 
Where: 
1 3, , , _ i q tA LM −  = the abnormal value for liquidity measure 1, 2, or 3, on day t relative to quarter 
q’s earnings announcement day (day 0) for stock i. 
1 3, , , i q tLM −  = the actual value for liquidity measure 1, 2, or 3, on day t relative to quarter q’s 
earnings announcement day for stock i. 
1 3, , _ i qM LM −  = the mean value for liquidity measure 1, 2, or 3, measured over the 25-day period 
from day -35 to day -11 relative to quarter q’s earnings announcement day for 
stock i. 
1 3, , _ i qS LM −  = the standard deviation of liquidity measure 1, 2, or 3, measured over the 25-
day period from day -35 to day -11 relative to quarter q’s earnings 
announcement day for stock i. 
  
Next, we estimate the following model for each of the 10 days before earnings announcement, for 






Based on the literature we use the log of market capitalization (LNMV), turnover defined as the 
daily number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding (TURN), the closing price 
(LN(PRC)) and the standard deviation of daily returns (STDRET) as control variables (e.g. Stoll, 1989). The 
first three control variables are averaged over the period from day -35 to day -11 relative to the quarterly 
earnings announcement day (day 0), and the standard deviation is based on daily returns during this period. 
LMitigationWords is as previously defined. 
We expect that in the days leading up to the earnings announcement date, stocks with a relatively 
high probability of trading by hackers experience a relatively high cost of liquidity. For example, on day -
10, suppliers of liquidity might still be relatively unconcerned about trading on hacked information about 
the forthcoming earnings announcement. We therefore would not expect the coefficient of 
LMitigationWords to be significantly different from zero for the sample of day -10 observations. In contrast, 
for the sample of day -1 observations, we predict that the coefficient of LMitigationWords is significantly 
negative. This is because relative to suppliers of liquidity for firms with high cybersecurity risk mitigation, 
suppliers of liquidity for firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation are more likely to be concerned about 
digital insiders trading on information about the forthcoming earnings announcement. Facing a higher 
probability of trading with hackers, suppliers of liquidity to low cybersecurity risk mitigation firms will 
require higher compensation to recoup the (expected) losses incurred by trading with these informed traders.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the coefficient of LMitigationWords, where equation (10) is estimated 
for each of the 10 trading days preceding quarterly earnings announcements, including LMitigationWords 
but not LCyberWords. We find that the effective spread is significantly negatively related to the firm’s score 
on LMitigationWords on the four days immediately before earnings announcements. For measures of the 
adverse selection component of the spread, LAMBDA and AMI, we find that both measures are significantly 
1 3, , , 1 , 2 ,
3 , 4 , 5 , , ,
_ i q t i q i q
i q i q i q i q t
A LM a CyberWordsLMitigationWords L
LNMV TURN STDRET YearFE
β β
β β β ε
− = + +
+ + + + +
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negatively related to a firm’s score on LMitigationWords on the three days immediately before earnings 
announcements. 
Panel B presents the results of equation (10) after including LCyberWords as an additional control 
and reports the coefficients of LCyberWords and LMitigationWords. On the three days immediately before 
earnings announcements, the effective spread is significantly negatively related to a firm’s value for 
LMitigationWords. In contrast, the coefficient of LCyberWords is not significantly related to the effective 
spread on any of the ten days preceding the earnings announcements. We find similar results for both 
measures of the adverse selection component of the spread: the coefficients of both LAMBDA and AMI are 
significantly negatively related to a firm’s score on LMitigationWords in the three days before earnings 
announcements, whereas LCyberWords is not significantly related to these measures of liquidity. 
Overall, we conclude that the results in Table 4 are consistent with our conjecture that for days 
when it is more likely that digital insiders might exploit illegally acquired inside information, the cost of 
liquidity, and in particular the measures of adverse selection, increases more for firms with lower 
cybersecurity risk mitigation relative to firms with higher cybersecurity risk mitigation.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
5 Robustness tests 
We examine the sensitivity of our results to a firm’s more general level of disclosure and overall 
focus on risk mitigation by controlling for 10-K characteristics. We augment equations (7) and (8) by 
including L10KWords, which captures the natural log of the number of words in the 10-K plus one, and 
L10KMitigationWords, which captures the occurrences of risk mitigation words across the entire 10-K 
(excluding the cybersecurity related excerpts) plus one. In addition, we continue to include LCyberWords 
as an additional control variable. 
Table 5 presents results of these tests. In panel A, the relation between LMitigationWords and the 
price jump ratio continues to hold after including controls for 10-K disclosure characteristics. Similarly, in 
panel B, after controlling for 10-K characteristics, the relation between the earnings surprise and pre-
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announcement short selling continues to be more negative for firms with relatively low scores on 
LMitigationWords.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
6 Conclusion 
There is growing awareness that hackers target corporations to obtain non-public corporate 
information for illegal trading. Spurred by growing concerns about hacking activities, this study examines 
whether a firm’s cybersecurity risk mitigation affects the extent to which its private information is traded 
on and is reflected in prices before earnings announcements. We capture a firm’s cybersecurity risk 
mitigation by assessing and scoring cyber-related disclosures in their 10-Ks, with a particular focus on 
discussion related to cybersecurity risk mitigation.  
We first provide evidence that firms with higher cybersecurity risk mitigation experience relatively 
large price changes at the time of the earnings announcement, i.e., a high price jump ratio, indicating that a 
greater amount of information remains undiscovered until it is publicly revealed. Further tests show that 
pre-announcement trading by short sellers is more predictive of earnings announcement surprises for firms 
with low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores. Finally, we exploit increased information asymmetry in the 
period just before earnings announcements and demonstrate that relative to other pre-announcement days, 
firms with lower cybersecurity risk mitigation scores experience a larger increase in the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread shortly before earnings announcements. Collectively, these findings 
indicate firms with better cybersecurity risk mitigation are associated with a lower extent to which private 
information is traded on and reflected in prices before publication of new earnings information. 
 We identify hacking as a new source of information for informed trading. Based upon measures of 
cybersecurity risk mitigation as disclosed in 10-Ks, we find evidence consistent with leakage of information 
through hacking prior to earnings announcements. Further, these leaks appear to be anticipated by market 
makers and other suppliers of liquidity, who charge a premium based upon the expectation of facing 
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informed traders prior to earnings announcements. We also find evidence that this information leads to 
more profitable short selling around earnings announcements. Overall, we find that weak cybersecurity risk 
mitigation increases exposure to cybercrimes, resulting in opportunities for acquisition of private 
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Appendix A  
A1. Construction of Cybersecurity risk Mitigation Scores 
Cybersecurity risk mitigation scores are calculated based on cyber-related disclosures in firm’s 10-
Ks. To identify cyber-related disclosures, we developed a keyword list using a glossary of common 
cybersecurity terminology from the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS) and 
a report on laws relating to cybersecurity prepared by the Congressional Research Service (Fischer 2014). 
Cyber-related keywords and phrases were incorporated into the disclosure mapping logic to develop an 
initial corpus of cyber-security disclosures. This dictionary was refined through an iterative process of 
testing the original list against samples of disclosures from a variety of industry groupings. In this process, 
an effort was made to prune false positives while minimizing the risk of false negatives. 
Each cyber excerpt was assigned a score (CyberWords) which is the word count of the cyber 
excerpt. Next, we identify a list of mitigation-related words to create a score that reflects cybersecurity risk 
mitigation (MitigationWords). The dictionary of mitigation words was developed by a team consisting of 
one of the authors on this project and two other independent research assistants. The team independently 
went through cyber excerpts and identified mitigation-related words and phrases. The team then resolved 
any discrepancies and refined the dictionary. Each mitigation word / phrase found within the excerpt is 
given a score of one and scores are tallied across all excerpts identified as true positives within a particular 




A2. Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation Wordlist  
actionable  privacy and security management 
address the risk  privacy program 
analysis of our security  project(i|e) 
analysis of our technologies  protect 
ciso  protocol 
compliance  remedi 
confidentiality agreement  risk and fraud management 
consult  security analysis 
data management  security brief 
detect  security capabil 
develop new polic(y|ies)  security enhancement 
encrypt  security process 
enhancement  security program 
expert  security protocol 
hardened firewall  security review 
implement  security solution 
independent analysis  security tool 
independent review  self( |\\-)regulatory 
insur  standards review 
mitigat  strategy 
monitor  tak(e|ing) step 
monitoring solution  train 
personnel  validat 
polic(y|ies) review  verif 
policies procedures and controls  voluntary self( |\\-)disclosure 
policy solution  vulnerability assessment 
pre(| |\\-)emptive  vulnerability management 
predict   




A3. Examples of Cyber Excerpts Containing Risk Mitigation Themes 
 
1. Ellie Mae (FY 2015, reporting date: Feb 25, 2016)  
16 cybersecurity-related excerpts were identified with a total MitigationWords score of 51. Below is an 
example for 1 out of the 16 excerpts.    
 
“All sensitive data transmitted over public networks is encrypted using industry standard encryption 
protocols in order to protect sensitive data against third-party disclosure in transit. Servers and network 
components are secured with access control mechanisms and protected by hardened firewalls, virus 
protection, and intrusion prevention/detection systems. Security services are monitored and updated in 
order to address emerging vulnerabilities. Even with our current security monitoring and detection 
systems, we cannot guarantee that our security measures will prevent security breaches. We are committing 
significant resources to protect against and remedy any potential security breaches and their consequences 
and intend to keep doing so in the future. New threats and vulnerabilities are identified frequently and there 
are often time lags before our vendors deploy mitigations. In 2015 we made substantial investment in our 
network security infrastructure, including headcount and third party tools and systems. In 2016 and beyond 
we will continue to make substantial investments in our network security infrastructure to protect the 
confidentiality of the information stored in our data centers.” 
For this excerpt MitigationWords: 16  
 





2. Capella Education Company (FY 2015, reporting date: Feb 18, 2016)  
4 cybersecurity-related excerpts were identified with a total MitigationWords score of 15. Below is an 
example for 1 out of the 4 excerpts.    
 
“Capella has an information security program that includes leadership, tools, processes, and training. To 
protect our information assets, Capella’s information security practices are designed to reduce information 
security and IT risks, respond to incidents, establish appropriate standards and controls, and establish, 
implement, and maintain information security policies and procedures. These practices include an 
education and training program on information security and privacy matters for employees and external 
stakeholders.”  
For this excerpt MitigationWords: 5 
 








3. Fossil Group (FY 2016, reporting date: Feb 29, 2016)  
6 cybersecurity-related excerpts were identified with a total MitigationWords score of 7. Below is an 
example for 1 out of the 4 excerpts.    
 
“We may experience operational problems with our information systems as a result of system failures, 
viruses, computer “hackers” or other causes. Any material disruption or slowdown of our systems could 
cause information, including data related to customer orders, to be lost or delayed which could result in 
delays in the delivery of merchandise to our stores and customers or lost sales, which could reduce demand 
for our merchandise and cause our sales to decline. Moreover, the failure to maintain, or a disruption in, 
financial and management control systems could have a material adverse effect on our ability to respond to 
trends in our target markets, market our products and meet our customers’ requirements.”  
For this excerpt MitigationWords: 0 
 





Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition Source 
Cybersecurity risk mitigation score 
MitigationWords Number of cyber mitigation words or phrases in all cyber-related 
excerpts in a firm’s disclosures in the entire 10-K filing for a given year. 
10-Ks 
LMitigationWords Natural logarithm of MitigationWords plus one. 10-Ks 
Liquidity measures 
ESPREAD Effective spread. The difference between an estimate of the true value of 
the security (the midpoint of the bid and ask) and the actual transaction 
price. 
DTAQ 
LAMBDA Kyle’s lambda. DTAQ 
AMI Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, computed as the ratio of absolute 
value of daily stock return to the daily dollar trading volume 
CRSP 
PJR, Earnings surprise and short selling measures  
PJR Price Jump Ratio, computed as abnormal returns relative to a Fama and 
French (1992) three-factor model using daily returns over a 365-calendar 
day window ending 90 days before the earnings announcement. The pre-
announcement window starts on day -21 and ends 2 trading days after the 
earnings announcement. The announcement return window starts on day 
0 and ends 2 days after the earnings announcement. 
CRSP 
RSURPRISE The quarterly rank decile of the earnings surprise, where earnings 
surprise is defined as the difference between the actual earnings per share 
and the most recent average earnings per share forecast from I/B/E/S, 
scaled by the absolute value of this most recent average earnings per 
share forecast. 
I/B/E/S 
( 5, 1)ASHVOL − −  Average daily abnormal short volume over the week before the earnings 
announcement. 
FINRA 
Firm controls  
CyberWords Number of words or phrases in all cyber-related excerpts in a firm’s 
disclosures in the entire 10-K filing for a given year. 
CookESG 
LCyberWords Natural logarithm of CyberWords plus one. CookESG 
LNMV The natural logarithm of the stock’s market capitalization. The merged CRSP - 
COMPUSTAT 
IO Institutional ownership ratio at the end of the preceding quarter. Thomson Reuters 
ANALYST Number of analysts covering the stock. I/B/E/S 
LN(PRC) Natural logarithm of the closing share price. CRSP 
TURN Number of shares traded as a proportion of shares outstanding (in 
thousands) 
CRSP 
BM Book to market equity ratio. The merged CRSP - 
COMPUSTAT 
BIDASK Percentage difference between the closing bid and share price. CRSP 
STDRET Standard deviation of daily stock  CRSP 
CAR(-40,-6) Cumulative abnormal return over event dates -40 to -6. CRSP 
CAR(-5,-1) Cumulative abnormal return over event dates -5 to -1. CRSP 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Cybersecurity risk mitigation score and controls 
 N Mean Median Std Dev Min. Max. 
MitigationWords 30,187 6.469 3.000 13.000 0.000 305.000 
LMitigationWords 30,187 1.338 1.386 1.125 0.000 5.724 
PJR 27,168 0.511 0.507 1.041 -3.201 4.288 
ESPREAD 30,187 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.014 
LAMBDA 30,187 0.249 0.101 0.407 0.005 2.558 
AMI 30,187 10.071 3.329 20.218 0.067 137.945 
ASHVOL(-5,-1) 30,187 0.013 0.009 0.038 -0.077 0.139 
RSURPRISE 30,187 4.496 4.000 2.868 0.000 9.000 
LCyberWords 30,187 5.241 5.886 2.272 0.000 9.712 
LNMV 30,187 14.419 14.275 1.628 11.383 18.792 
LN(PRC) 30,187 3.297 3.395 0.970 0.598 5.409 
LN(STDRET) 30,187 -4.030 -4.069 0.513 -5.110 -2.652 
ANALYST 30,187 9.680 7.000 7.304 1.000 33.000 
IO 30,187 0.598 0.677 0.276 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the cybersecurity risk mitigation scores measure and firm control 




Panel B: Pearson correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 MitigationWords             
2 LMitigationWords 0.72            
3 PJR 0.02 0.03           
4 ESPREAD -0.02 -0.02 -0.03          
5 LAMBDA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00         
6 AMI -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.14 0.01        
7 ASHVOL(-5,-1) -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.06       
8 RSURPRISE 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00      
9 LCyberWords 0.42 0.68 0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.05     
10 LNMV -0.04 -0.11 0.01 -0.63 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.01 0.18    
11 LN(PRC) -0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.51 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.09 0.69   
12 LN(STDRET) 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.48 -0.51  
13 ANALYST 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.42 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.17 0.69 0.39 -0.20 
This table reports Pearson correlations between the liquidity measures and the independent and control variables in our sample. The sample period 
is 2012 to 2016, and there are 30,187 firm-year observations. All correlations with an absolute value larger than 0.012 are significant at the 5% level 
and all correlations with an absolute value larger than 0.015 are significant at the 1% level. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 2: Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation and the Price Jump Ratio 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat 
Intercept  0.644 6.04  0.658 6.06  0.840 4.94  0.574 6.11  0.621 5.79  0.768 9.25 
LMitigationWords  0.026 3.79  0.020 2.21  0.012 0.84  0.028 4.22  0.028 3.82  0.015 2.64 
LCyberWords     0.004 1.03  0.005 0.84  0.002 0.42  -0.004 -1.06  0.001 0.32 
LNMV  -0.044 -5.86  -0.046 -5.86  -0.051 -3.48  -0.042 -5.65  -0.023 -2.37  -0.010 -1.65 
LN(PRC)  0.041 3.23  0.042 3.23  0.038 2.26  0.024 2.27  -0.004 -0.38  0.002 0.26 
BIDASK  -0.142 -2.59  -0.145 -2.63  -0.230 -2.96  -0.179 -3.69  -0.245 -5.09  -0.135 -3.69 
LN(STDRET)  -0.059 -2.74  -0.059 -2.76  -0.045 -1.34  -0.085 -5.06  -0.079 -5.37  -0.041 -3.07 
ANALYST  0.003 2.23  0.003 2.25  0.004 1.41  0.002 1.30  0.003 1.73  0.001 1.49 
IO  0.127 5.34  0.127 5.37  0.072 1.50  0.135 5.59  0.138 5.20  0.079 3.69 
Year FE  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
N  26,284  26,284  28,918  21,909  26,333  26,373 
Adj R2  0.005  0.005  0.001  0.013  0.007  0.004 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , ,
(+ )
( )
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
PJR a LMitigationWords LCyberWords LNMV LN PRC BIDASK
LN STDRET ANALYST IO
β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + +
 
This table presents the results of cybersecurity risk mitigation and the price jump ratio. Column (1) presents the base model. Column (2) reports the 
base model including both LMitigationWords and LCyberWords. Column (3) reports results when we only exclude the percentile of observations 
with the lowest absolute CAR(-21,+2) instead of the decile of observations with the smallest absolute CAR(-21,+2). Column (4) presents results 
when we drop the quartile of observations with the lowest absolute CAR(-21,+2). Columns (5) and (6) repeat the analysis in the third column but 
employ CAR(-10,+2) and CAR(-3,+2) in the denominator of the PJR, respectively.
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Table 3: Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation and Informativeness of Short Selling 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat 
Intercept  4.83 10.06  4.96 10.01  -0.05 -0.46  4.94 10.10  3.26 6.31  4.95 9.71 
LMitigationWords  0.18 7.36  0.13 3.83  0.03 3.32  0.13 3.90  0.15 3.76  0.13 3.67 
LMitigationWords × 
ASHVOL (-5,-1)  1.21 2.73  1.41 2.45  0.35 2.50  0.78 2.10  1.44 2.26  1.52 2.69 
ASHVOL (-5,-1)  -2.37 -3.24  -1.86 -1.62  0.01 0.04  -0.88 -1.09  -2.44 -2.15  -1.87 -1.64 
LCyberWords     0.03 1.92  0.00 0.94  0.03 1.94  0.03 1.60  0.03 1.72 
LCyberWords × 
ASHVOL (-5,-1)     -0.15 -0.56  -0.07 -1.01  -0.09 -0.48  -0.05 -0.17  -0.22 -0.84 
LNMV  0.02 0.64  0.00 0.07  0.01 1.51  0.00 0.10  0.08 2.13  0.00 0.09 
BM  -0.22 -2.28  -0.23 -2.32  -0.07 -2.07  -0.23 -2.34  -0.35 -4.50  -0.22 -2.25 
LN(PRC)  -0.17 -3.76  -0.16 -3.65  -0.02 -1.69  -0.16 -3.64  0.06 1.28  -0.16 -3.78 
BIDASK  -3.58 -0.16  -6.75 -0.30  4.17 0.72  -7.74 -0.35  25.19 1.08  -13.76 -0.61 
TURN  0.10 1.82  0.11 1.93  0.00 -0.12  0.10 1.90  0.02 0.41  0.12 2.16 
STDRET  -10.89 -3.93  -11.09 -3.97  -2.05 -1.83  -10.86 -3.89  -13.88 -3.99  -10.50 -3.46 
CAR(-40,-6)  52.68 5.49  52.73 5.52  10.73 5.88  52.98 5.53  50.98 4.89  54.04 5.14 
CAR(-5,-1)  20.88 5.39  20.84 5.36  4.59 4.79  20.67 5.30  21.32 6.28  21.35 5.69 
Year FE  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
N  29,639  29,639  29,639  29,639  27,075  29,639 






This table presents the results of cybersecurity risk mitigation and the informativeness of short selling. Column (1) presents the base model. Column 
(2) reports the base model including both LCyberWords and LMitigationWords. Column (3) reports the results when we use the actual earnings 
surprise instead of decile rank as the dependent variable. Column (4) presents the results when we capture abnormal short selling based on the day 
before the earnings announcement rather than the week before the earnings announcement. Column (5) reports the results when the earnings surprise 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
, 1 , 2 3 , 4 ,, ,
5 , 6 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 11 ,, , ,
5, 1 5, 1
40, 6   5, 1
i t i t i t i ti t i t
i t i t i t i t i ti t i t i t
RSURPRISE MitigationWords ASHVOL MitigationWords ASHVOL LNMV





α β β β β
β β β β β β β ε
= + + − − + × − − +




measure is calculated as the difference between the actual earnings per share and the most recent average earnings per share estimate across analysts, 
scaled by the standard deviation across analyst estimates. Column (6) presents the results using the median earnings per share forecast across analysts 
instead of the mean earnings per share forecast to calculate the earnings surprise measure. 
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Table 4: Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation and Liquidity in Pre-Earnings Announcements 








 (1) (2)  (3) 








-10  -0.006 -0.50  -0.007 -1.10  -0.007 -0.88 
-9  -0.010 -0.98  -0.009 -1.33  0.003 0.33 
-8  -0.003 -0.28  -0.010 -1.45  -0.010 -1.18 
-7  -0.008 -0.68  0.002 0.26  -0.003 -0.41 
-6  -0.007 -0.67  -0.007 -1.05  -0.015 -2.10 
-5  0.004 0.40  -0.007 -1.04  -0.012 -1.65 
-4  -0.024 -2.38  -0.012 -1.89  -0.012 -1.71 
-3  -0.020 -1.95  -0.037 -5.63  -0.030 -3.98 
-2  -0.030 -3.22  -0.027 -3.98  -0.025 -3.71 
-1  -0.027 -3.11  -0.041 -6.33  -0.040 -6.60 
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Panel B: Cybersecurity risk mitigation and liquidity leading up to earnings announcements including LCyberWords 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 ESPREAD  LAMBDA  AMI 
 LMitigationWords  LCyberWords  LMitigationWords  LCyberWords  LMitigationWords  LCyberWords 


























































































































The table presents the results of the coefficients of interest for each of the 10 days preceding earnings announcements (day 0) based on the following 
regression model: 
 
Panel A reports the estimated coefficients of models including only mitigation words LMitigationWords; and results in Panel B are for models 
including both LMitigationWords and LCyberWords. 
 
Liquidity is measured as: the quoted spread (QSPREAD), effective spread (ESPREAD), realized spread (RSPREAD), price impact (PI), lambda 
(LAMBDA) and Amihud’s illiquidity measure (AMI). All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter-
year. The sample period is 2012 to 2016 and there are 28,345 earnings announcements in our sample. *,**,*** represent significance significant at the 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
  
1 3, , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , , ,_ i q t i q i q i q i q i q i q tA LM a CyberWordsLMitigationWords L LNMV TURN STDRET YearFEβ β β β β ε− = + + + + + + +
42 
Table 5: Controlling for 10-K Characteristics 
Panel A: Cybersecurity risk mitigation and Price Jump Ratio 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat 
Intercept 0.708 5.32  0.938 4.90  0.628 5.96  0.612 5.54  0.815 9.28 
LMitigationWords 0.023 2.54  0.019 0.94  0.028 4.24  0.028 4.03  0.018 3.10 
LCyberWords 0.004 1.21  0.003 0.36  0.002 0.58  -0.003 -0.78  0.000 -0.14 
L10KWords -0.007 -1.47  -0.007 -0.72  -0.005 -1.39  0.001 0.18  -0.004 -1.10 
L10KMitigationWords -0.006 -2.41  -0.011 -1.87  -0.002 -0.98  -0.001 -0.33  0.000 -0.23 
LNMV 0.040 3.20  0.039 2.01  0.024 2.44  -0.001 -0.10  0.002 0.19 
LN(PRC) -0.145 -2.55  -0.286 -3.32  -0.181 -3.75  -0.247 -4.97  -0.128 -3.32 
BIDASK -0.043 -5.46  -0.048 -2.88  -0.040 -5.54  -0.025 -2.51  -0.010 -1.59 
STDRET -0.057 -2.76  -0.043 -1.10  -0.079 -4.65  -0.082 -4.80  -0.038 -2.71 
ANALYST 0.003 1.89  0.004 1.39  0.001 1.20  0.002 1.58  0.002 1.79 
IO 0.155 6.76  0.060 1.12  0.146 5.45  0.137 4.96  0.087 4.33 
N 26,284  28,918  21,909  26,333  26,373 
Adj R2 0.005  0.001  0.013  0.007  0.004 
 
Panel A presents the results of cybersecurity risk mitigation and the price jump ratio after controlling for 10-K characteristics (L10KWords and 
L10KMitigationWords). Columns (1) reports the base model including both LCyberWords and LMitigationWords. Column (2) reports the results 
when we only exclude the percentile of observations with the lowest absolute CAR(-21,+2) instead of the decile of observations with the smallest 
absolute CAR(-21,+2). Column (3) presents the results when we drop the quartile of observations with the lowest absolute CAR(-21,+2).  Columns 
(4) and (5) repeat the analysis in the first column but uses CAR(-10,+2) and CAR(-3,+2) in the denominator of the PJR, respectively.   
43 
Panel B: Cybersecurity risk mitigation and short selling activity 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat  Est. t-stat 
Intercept  4.909 10.79  -0.020 -0.18  3.291 7.15  4.885 10.57 
LMitigationWords  0.140 4.02  0.029 3.40  0.149 3.89  0.135 3.82 
LCyberWords  0.029 1.68  0.004 0.80  0.024 1.34  0.025 1.46 
L10KWordcount  0.000 0.05  0.000 0.01  -0.001 -0.14  0.000 0.03 
L10KMitigationWords  -0.005 -0.62  -0.002 -1.14  0.004 0.37  -0.006 -0.74 
ASHVOL (-5,-1)  -1.882 -1.19  0.281 0.55  -1.872 -1.50  -2.014 -1.33 
LCyberWords × ASHVOL (-5,-1)  -0.154 -0.60  -0.090 -1.18  -0.121 -0.45  -0.215 -0.81 
LMitigationWords × ASHVOL (-5,-1)  1.368 2.49  0.369 2.86  1.478 2.43  1.469 2.67 
L10KCyberWords × ASHVOL (-5,-1)  -0.011 -0.11  -0.035 -1.58  -0.073 -0.78  -0.007 -0.07 
L10KMitigationWords × ASHVOL (-5,-1)  0.026 0.16  0.004 0.11  0.023 0.17  0.054 0.34 
LNMV  0.011 0.36  0.011 1.46  0.074 2.24  0.014 0.45 
BM  -0.248 -2.46  -0.082 -2.32  -0.365 -4.64  -0.233 -2.39 
LN(PRC)  -0.174 -3.94  -0.023 -1.75  0.075 1.49  -0.180 -4.09 
BIDASK  -0.032 -0.14  0.027 0.47  0.344 1.60  -0.106 -0.47 
TURN  0.120 2.31  -0.003 -0.19  0.020 0.41  0.138 2.60 
STDRET  -11.898 -4.06  -2.202 -1.92  -13.861 -4.00  -11.392 -3.56 
CAR(-40,-6)  53.405 5.59  11.212 6.3  51.517 4.82  54.684 5.18 
CAR(-5,-1)  21.350 5.33  4.611 4.72  21.417 6.08  21.801 5.68 
N  29,639  29,639  27,075  29,639 
Adj R2  0.017  0.001  0.030  0.017 
Panel B presents the results of cybersecurity risk mitigation and the informativeness of short selling after controlling for 10-K characteristics 
(L10KWords and L10KMitigationWords). Column (1) reports the results using ranked decile rank earnings surprise as the dependent variable. 
Column (2) reports the results when we use the actual earnings surprise instead of decile rank as the dependent variable. Column (3) reports the 
results when the earnings surprise measure is calculated as the difference between the actual earnings per share and the most recent average earnings 
per share estimate across analysts, scaled by the standard deviation across analyst estimates. Column (4) presents the results using the median 
earnings per share forecast across analysts instead of the mean earnings per share forecast to calculate the earnings surprise measure. 
